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A scientific theory, such as the one described in the several volumes of this work, the theory of the universe of motion, consists of a set of assumptions that define the theory, together with the consequences of these assumptions, developed by applying logical and mathematical processes to the basic premises. The ordinary scientific theory covers only a limited portion of the total scientific field, and it is therefore an addition to established scientific knowledge rather than an independent structure. Hence it necessarily utilizes various items from the currently accepted body of scientific knowledge in the development of its consequences. The theory of the universe of motion, on the other hand, deals with the physical universe as a whole, and is entirely selfcontained. All of the conclusions as to the consequences of this theory are derived from the basic postulates without introducing anything from any other source.

We have now arrived at the point, however, where it should be recognized that the foregoing statement applies to the theory of the universe of motion as a scientific product. Science itself is not entirely self-contained. In order to make scientific investigation possible, and to give meaning to the results thereof, it is necessary to make certain preliminary assumptions of a philosophical nature. The validity of these assumptions is accepted by the workers in the field of science as a condition of becoming scientists, and since these assumptions form a background for all scientific work, they are not ordinarily mentioned in scientific discourse, except in those instances where the topics under consideration are on the borderline between science and philosophy. In this concluding chapter of the present volume we will undertake to examine some of the questions that arise along this borderline, and in preparation for that examination we will want to look at the philosophical underpinnings of physical science: ”the metaphysical presuppositions of science,“ 335 as one writer calls them. These include the following:

    (a) lt is assumed that the universe is rational.
    (b) It is assumed that the same physical laws and principles apply throughout the universe.
    (c) It is assumed that the results of specific physical actions are reproducible.
    (d) It is assumed that the subject of scientific investigation is an objectively real universe.
    (e) It is assumed that physical changes (effects) result from causes.
    (f) It is assumed that the results of scientific investigation, when verified in accordance with standard scientific practice, are certain and permanent. (g) It is assumed that the laws and principles of the physical universe are, in effect, restrictions, and that whatever they do not prohibit exists.

Most members of the scientific community simply take these assumptions as axiomatic. Indeed, the great majority of rank and file scientists would be quite surprised to find that anyone questions such assumptions as the rationality of the universe, for example. But some exceptions have been taken to specific items in the list, mainly by individuals who are particularly interested in the philosophical aspects of science. An element of uncertainty has thus been introduced into the substratum of physical science. The development of the theory of the universe of motion has now clarified this situation, and has demonstrated that the criticisms of these basic assumptions are invalid. It appears, however, that a few of the criticisms that have been offered are of sufficient interest, in view of the publicity that they have received, to warrant some discussion in this work. The assumptions to which the following comments refer are identified by the same letter symbols that were used in the earlier listing.

(a) If the universe were not rational, the scientific objective of arriving at a systematic understanding of the activities of the universe would be an impossible task. It is true that, as noted in Chapter 29, some prominent scientists have characterized the realm of the very small as irrational, but what this amounts to is excluding this domain from the scientific field. Our findings indicate that this exclusion is unnecessary.

(b) In present-day practice, the Principle of Uniformity, as we may call it, has not been accepted in its entirety, because the theorists have been unable to find explanations on this basis for the phenomena of some special areas, such as the sub-atomic region or the interiors of the stars. However, it is accepted in a kind of a selective way, and regarded as applying whenever it does not inconvenience the theorists, but leaving open the possibility of deviations in special situations. The clarification of the physical relations in the far-out regions that has been,accomplished by the development described in this work has now shown that there are no exceptions to this general principle. The difficulties in the special areas that have led to suggestions as to exceptions have been due to inadequate understanding of the phenomena in these areas.

(c) The assumption of reproducibility is usually stated in terms of the reproducibility of experiments, but it is equally applicable to any other type of physical action.

(d) One school of philosophy contends that the universe exists only in our minds. This is a difficult position to contravene, as its defenders can simply extend it to apply to the premises of any adverse argument. But as scientists, we can dismiss this point of view as irrelevant. A subjective universe cannot be distinguished from an objectively real universe by any means at our command, and from a scientific standpoint where there is no distinction there is no difference.

A modification of this point of view that has some support among scientists concedes reality only to the information received by the senses. The advocates of this interpretation point out (correctly) that we do not perceive physical objects directly; we have direct knowledge only of the ”sense-data.“ Our concepts of physical objects are theoretical constructs based on these data. The conclusion that they have drawn from this is that only the sense data have objective reality, and that all else is a creation of the human mind. As expressed by G. C. McVittie:

    A preferable alternative to the doctrine of the rational External World is to regard science as a method of correlating sense-data . . . On4this view, the corpus of sense-data may, or may not, form a rational whole, but the human mind by selecting classes of data succeeds in grouping them into rational systems . . . Unobservables such as light, atoms, eiectromagnetic and gravitational fietds, etc., are not constituents of an independently existing rational External World; they are but concepts useful in the manufacture of systems of correlation.336

Other observers have adopted an intermediate position, conceding reality to some features of the universe, primarily macroscopic objects; but denying the reality, in this same sense, of other features-atoms and electrons, for example. Heisenberg cautions us specifically that we must not regard the smallest parts of matter as being objectively real in the same sense in which rocks and trees are real.337 ”Atoms are neither things nor objects,“ he says, ”atoms are paris of observational situations. ”338 In another attempt to describe this strange half-world in which the ”official“ school of modern physics places the basic units of matter, he characterizes the atom as ”in a way, only a symbol. ”339

The theory of the universe of motion has provided a definitive answer to these questions about reaGty. There i.s an external universe independent of the human race, and independent of any observations that they may make. The physical universe is a universe of motion; that is, motion is the reality of which the universe is composed. Motions and combinations thereof are therefore ”real“ in any ordinary sense of the word. The relations between these motions have a somewhat different status, and whether they can be considered real depends on how that term is defined. In any event, some of the ”unobservables“ of modern physics, the nucleus of the atom, for instance, are wholly non-existent. Some, such as electromagnetic and gravitational fields, are merely special ways of looking at physical situations-that is, describing the relations between motions-and belong in the same category in which we place such concepts as the center of gravity or the poles of the earth. But the smallest subdivisions of matter, the atoms and sub-atomic particles, have exactly the same claim to reality as the largest aggregates of matter; the smallest subdivisions of electricity, the electrons, have the same claim to reality as the heaviest electric currents; and so on. Whether or not the entity in question is observable, as matters now stand, is irrelevant.

It should be understood, however, that reality, as defined above, is physical reality; that is, the reality of the universe of motion. This does not necessarily exclude the possibility that there may be reality of a different nature: a nonphysical reality.

(e) The same frustrations that have led modern scientists to invent theories where their efforts to apply inductive reasoning to their problems have encountered difficulties have also impelled them to jettison any of the previously accepted scientific or philosophical principles that might happen to stand in the way of the inventions. Some are even ready to discard logic, one of the foundations of the structure of scientific knowledge. For example, F. Waismann asserts that ”Quantum physics presents a strong case against traditional logic"340-an upside down conclusion, if there ever was one. But the favorite target of those who seek to make things easier for the theorists is the connection between cause and effect.

Like Waismann, most of the others who are attempting to brush aside ihose principles that stand in the way of the currently fashionable ideas rely primarily on the quantum theory, with some assistance from relativity and other theoretical products of the modern era, according these theories a status superior to that of the previously accepted principles. As it happens, this quantum theory that is now being used as ammunition with which to attack some of the essential features of traditional scientific procedure is itself based on a sound principle, existence only in discrete units, that was derived by one of these standard scientific procedures: generalization of empirical findings. The development of tbe theory of the universe of motion has now shown that this discrete unit principle is one of the key elements in the basic framework of the physical universe. But because conventional science is unaware of the directional reversals that take place at the unit levels, it has not been able to arrive at a theoretical explanation of events inside unit distance that is consistent with the established laws of physics. This put the theorists in a position where it seemed that they either had to give up quantum theory or sacrifice some of the established philosophical principles. They chose the latter course, and quantum theory, as now constituted, not only defies logic, but also causality and continuity of existence (that is, it asserts that an object may exist at point A at one time and at point B at another time without having been anywhere in the interim). The abandonment of causality is particularly stressed by the expositors of the theory, as in the following statement:

    Whenever he [the physicist] penetrates to the atomic, or electronic level in his analysis, he finds things acting in a way for which he can assign no cause, for which he can never assign a cause, and for which the concept of cause has no meaning, if Heisenberg's principle is right. This means nothing more nor less than that the law of cause and effect must be given up.341 (P. W. Bridgman)

In the universe of motion all entities and phenomena are motions, combinations of motions, or relations between motions. It follows that any physical event X involves modification of an existing motion combination A by another motion or combination B. Motion B is then the cause of event X. However, the initial combination A was itself the result of a previous event Y in which a then existing motion combination C was modified by a motion D to produce combination A. Thus D can also be regarded as a cause of event X. In fact, any physical event has what amounts to an infinite number of causes. This event is the intersection of two or more causal systems, and might be compared to a major river, which is the result of continual joining of the products of intersection of an almost infinite number of rivulets. Thus the conclusions of quantum theory leading to the abandonment of causality must be rejected.

In this connection, however, it is necessary to distinguish between causality and determinism. ”There is some disagreement among scientists about the concept of causality. Among many it is essentially equivalent to the notion of determinism.342 (R. B. Lindsay) But there is a distinct difference between the two concepts. Causality implies nothing more than the existence of a cause for every physical event. Determinism includes the further premise that the same cause applied to the same kind of a situation always produces the same result. In the universe of conventional science, which is a universe of matter, non-material causes act upon material ”things,“ and there are grounds for concluding that the same cause should produce the same effect if applied to the same thing under the same conditions. However, the real world does not act in this manner, and the reaction of ”modern science“ has been to throw the baby out with the bath water; that is, to reject causality.

Our finding that both matter and non-material phenomena are manifestations of motion now resolves the problem. On this basis, cause and effect are simply aspects of the interaction of motions. Causality is maintained in all cases, because a motion cannot be changed except by an interaction with another motion (since nothing exists but motions). But, as we have seen in the preceding pages, there are continual interchanges between different kinds of motion-between scalar and vectorial motion, between one-dimensional motion and two or three-dimensional motion, between motion in space and motion in time-and many of these interchanges involve redetermination of direction or magnitude by chance processses. Because of this intervention by chance, the exact results of such interactions are unpredictable. Thus, while causality is maintained throughout the physical world, determinism is ruled out.

(f) On the basis of this assumption, physical science has a permanent, and ever-growing, core of positively established knowledge. This is the view of traditional science, a view that is still accepted by the great majority of scientists. But the general relaxation of scientific standards that has accompanied the introduction of inventive theories in modern times has confused the situation to the point where there is no longer any clear distinction between today's best guess and established fact. This has led to a contention on the part of some scientists and philosophers that no scientific findings are positively established, an assertion that is welcomed in some quarters because it tends to excuse the deficiencies of many unverified theories. ”The notion that scientific knowledge is certain is an illusion,“ 343 says Marshall Walker.

This point of view is based largely on an unrealistic concept of ”certainty.“ It is true that no physicai statement can be verified with what we may call mathematical certainty, in which the probability of error is zero. Because of the nature of physical observations, the best that we can do in any physical situation is to arrive at a point where the probability of error is negligible, a physical certainty, we may say. But from a practical standpoini, this physical certainty is fully equivalent to mathematical certainty. Drawing a distinction between the two is meaningless hairsplitting. A theory is verified when its validity is established with physical certainty.

In this connection, it is important to recognize that scientific statements can be verified only if they are properly expressed so that they stay within the limits to which comparisons with observation can be made. Much of the erroneous thinking in this area is due to a lack of precision in defining the items that are involved. For example, we cannot ordinarily verify a statement in the form y = 3x, where x and y are physical variables (unless this proposition can be incorporated into one of greater scope that can be verified as a whole). In order to be verifiable, the statement will usually have to be put into the form: Within the limits x = a and x = b, y = 3x to an accuracy of one part in 10`: When thus expressed and validated by comparison with the results of observation, this statement constitutes exact and permanent knowledge, regardless of whether some future findings may show that the relation is invalid somewhere outside the limits specified, or that there is a deviation of less than one part in 10z under some circumstances. As Lecomte du Nouy points out, ”science has never had to retract an affirmation based on facts that are well established within accurately defined limits.“ 344

In support of his assertion that there is no certain scientific knowledge, Walker tells us that ”New models are often quite radically different from their predecessors, and often require the abandonment of ideas that have long been considered obvious and axiomatic.“ This comment illustrates one of the common errors in thought that underlie the denial of scientific certainty. Walker bases his conclusion on the observation that many ”models“ and presumably ”obvious and axiomatic“ ideas ultimately had to be abandoned. But the truth is that few models ever qualify as scientific knowledge. Models do not attempt to cover all aspects of the phenomena with which they deal (if they did, they would be theories, not models), and consequently they are inherently erroneous, either in part or in their entirety. The failure of these models to stand the test of time therefore has no relevance to the status of firmly established knowledge. Likewise, if an assertedly ”obvious and axiomatic“ idea can be definitely verified, it then constitutes scientific knowledge, and is both certain and permanent. If it fails the test of comparison with the observed facts, then it is not, and never was, ”obvious and axiomatic,“ nor is it scientific knowledge, and the necessity of discarding it has no significance in the present context.

(g) This principle is commonly expressed in the statement that ”What can exist does exist.“ K. W. Ford puts it in this manner:

    One of the elementary rules of nature is that, in the absence of a law prohibiting an event or phenomenon, it is bound to occur with some degree of probability. To put it simply and crudely: Anything that can happen does happen.345

This author uses the word ”happen“ rather than ”exist,“ but as he notes in another connection, at the basic level ”there is no clear distinction between what is and what happens. “ 346

This principle is not as well known, as a principle of nature, among scientists in general as those previously discussed, but they all employ it, usually unconsciously, in a great variety of applications. It is this principle that provides the justification for interpolation and extrapolation. It has been the key factor in such theoretical anticipations as Mendeleev's prediction of previously unknown elements, Dirac's prediction of the positron, and myriads of other, less dramatic, scientific advances. And it is the essence of the lines of reasoning that are being employed in the current attempts to evaluate the possibility of life elsewhere in the universe. As can be seen in these illustrations, the absence of a prohibition is first established in one area. The principle that what can exist does exist is then invoked to justify the assertion that the phenomenon in question also exists in the other areas.

The validity of this principle, in application to the physical universe, has been clearly established by our findings. In many cases, entities or phenomena that would otherwise exist, on the basis of this principle, are excluded by adverse probabilities or other specific factors. Aside from these exclusions, all of the entities or phenomena that are theoreticatly possible within the area thus far covered in the investigation have their counterparts in the observed physical universe. It is true that only a relatively small portion of the universe as a whole has been examined in the context of the new theoretical system, but the area of coverage includes the basic phenomena of all of the major subdivisions of physical science, and many thousands of individual items. The probability that there is any violation of this principle anywhere in the universe has thus been reduced to a negligibie level.

Addition of these philosophical principles to the physical knowledge set forth in this and the preceding volumes now puts us in a position where we are able to arrive at answers to some long-standing questions about fundamental issues. We will begin with

    1. Is the physical universe finite or infinite?

In past discussion of this subject it has usually been assumed that the question reduces to a matter of whether or not space is finite. Those who favor the finite alternative generally envision some kind of a space curvature, a geometry that permits space to be finite, yet unbounded. As brought out in Volume I, space as ordinarily conceived-extension space, in terms of this work-is not a physical entity. It is merely a reference system, a purely mental construction. As such, it can be thought of as infinite. But the space that actually exists in a physical sense is the space aspect of the existing motion of the universe. The question as to whether this space is finite or infinite therefore becomes a question as to whether the amount of motion in the universe is finite.

The finding that the activity of the universe is cyclic answers this question immediately. A cyclic system is a closed system; it is finite. In the universe of motion, spatial structures exist only for a limited time; that is, a limited segment of the time progression. Temporal structures (in the cosmic sector) exist only during a limited segment of the space progression.

The principal obstacle that stands in the way of acceptance of the idea of a finite universe is the observed outward motion of the photons of light and other electromagnetic radiation. On first consideration, it would seem that, regardless of what the aggregates of matter may be doing, the radiation is being dispersed outward into space, and is eventually lost from the universe as we know it. But we now find that this apparent outward movement of the photons is an illusion due to the inward movement of the gravitationally bound system from which we are doing our observing. The photons actually have no capability of independent motion. This is why the physicists have never been able to find a mechanism for the ”propagation of radiation.“ There is no such propagation, and therefore no need for a mechanism. The prevailing impression is that Einstein provided an explanation for this phenomenon, but, in fact, what he did was to dismiss the problem as too difficult. In a statement quoted in Volume I, he characterizes the situation in this manner:

    Our only way out . . . seems to be to take for granted the fact that space has the physical property of transmitting electromagnetic waves, and not to bother too much about the meaning of this statement.347

Since the photons of radiation remain at their points of origin, in the natural system of reference, their ultimate fate is not to be lost in the depths of space, as observations from our locations in the universe of motion appear to indicate. We are doing our observing from locations that are moving inward at high rates of speed, and our observations are distorted accordingly. All photons remain in the space over which the matter of the universe is distributed. It follows that they must ultimately encounter, and be absorbed by, matter. They are then transformed into thermal motion, or participate in the atom building process by which radiation is reconverted into matter. A small fraction of the total are able to pass into the cosmic sector, appearing there as a ”background radiation“ of the type discussed in Chapter 30.

    2. Did the universe evolve from a primitive condition, or has it been in the same condition in which we now observe it during its entire existence?

The results of the development of theory in the preceding pages of this and the previous volumes are consistent with either of these alternatives. The evolution in each sector begins with matter in a primitive dispersed condition, but it does not necessarily follow that there was ever a time at which all matter was in this condition. In any event, even if the universe did originate in a primitive condition, theoretical considerations indicate that it would eventually arrive at an equilibrium such as that which now appears to exist.

    3. Did the universe have a beginning, or has it always existed?

The two parts of this question are not mutually exclusive, as they appear to be. We can answer the second part affirmatively, but this does not necessarily mean that the answer to the first part is negative. Such words as ”always“ and ”before“ presuppose the existence of time. ”Always“ means ”during all time.“ ”Before“ means ”at an earlier time.“ The universe has always existed; that is, it has existed throughout all time, because time exists only as a constituent of that physical universe.

In the sense in which it is being asked, the first part of this question is meaningless, as it assumes that the existence of time is independent of the existence of the universe. Whether or not the question might have a real significance on the basis of something other than a sequence in time is beyond the scope of the present work.

    4. Will the universe eventually come to an end?

All individual objects in the physical universe, including the earth and the solar system, have finite life spans, and their existence will eventually terminate. But there is nothing in the physical system that would end the existence of the universe as a whole. The physical universe is a self-contained, and self-perpetuating mechanism. It will continue on the present basis indefinitely, unless it is destroyed by some outside agency. The question as to whether any such outside agency exists will be considered later.

    5. Was the universe created by some agency?

The development of theory in this work sheds no light on the question of creation. The only thing that exists in the physical universe is motion. Our theory, as it now stands, defines what motion is, and what it does, but not how it originated, or whether it had an origin. Since time, in a universe of motion, exists only as an aspect of that motion, the universe and time are coeval. On this basis, the universe has existed always-during all time-regardless of whether or not it originated from an act of creation. Neither the theory of the universe of motion, nor the many hitherto unrecognized physical facts uncovered during its development, gives any indication as to whether a creation occurred. This remains a wide open question, so far as science is concemed.

    6. Is the activity of the physical universe purposeful, or is it simply mechanistic?

The finding that the physical universe consists entirely of a finite quantity of motion means that it is purely mechanistic. However, this does not preclude the possibility that the existence of this machine may have a purpose. This is an issue on which our study of the mechanism sheds no light, although it does clear the way for a study of the problem.

    7. Is the human race merely part of the machine, or does it, in some way, have an independent role?

Conventional science takes a somewhat ambivalent attitude toward this question. It portrays the universe as strictly mechanistic, and yet introduces the concept of an ”observer,“ whose presence is presumed to have a significance with respect to the outcome of physical processes. The effect of the new information derived from the development of the theory of the universe of motion on our understanding of the relation of the human race to its physical environment has been explored in connection with an extension of the physical investigation into the non-physical fields, the results of which will be reported in a separate publication.

    8. Are we alone, or is there intelligent life elsewhere in the universe?

This is a long-standing question that has entered a new phase since the development of communication processes that are, at least potentially, capable of transmitting and receiving messages from distant planets. It is now a lively subject of discussion and speculation, and some steps have been taken toward a systematic search for evidence of extra-terrestrial life. This question can be subdivided into the following three parts:

    1. Are there other locations in the universe in which the physical conditions are suitable for the existence of life?
    2. Does life necessarily develop in some fraction of the suitable locations?
    3. Where life exists, does it necessarily evolve into intelligent life under the most favorable conditions?

The results obtained from the theory of the universe of motion enable giving an affirmative answer to the first of these subsidiary issues. As brought out in Chapter 7, our findings indicate not only that there are an enormous number of planetary systems, but also that the planets in these systems are distributed in distance from their controlling stars in accordance with Bode's Law (as revised). This means that the great majority of the systems include at least one planet within the habitable zone, a planet that may be suitable for the development of the higher forms of life.

Inasmuch as the results reported in the several volumes of this work do not extend into the biological field, they do not provide answers for the other two subdivisions of the main question. However, the'se results have verified the status of the postulates of the theory of the universe of motion as a correct definition of the physical universe. If life is a physical phenomenon, then it, too, is defined by these postulates. Thus the theory opens an avenue of approach to these other two issues. A preliminary study along these lines has been included in the extension of the physical investigation that was mentioned in the answer to question 7.

    9. If there are intelligent beings elsewhere in the universe, will we eventually be able to make some kind of contact with them?
    At the present stage of our knowledge, any answer to this question would be pure speculation.

    10. Is there anything outside (that is, independent of) the universe of motion?

This is probably the most important question that can be asked by members of the human race. Many persons, particularly those with strong religious ties, will be inclined to contest this assertion, having in mind issues that are more directly connected with their specific beliefs. But we can safely predict that if these alternative questions are carefully examined it will be found that they have no meaning unless this question number 10 can be answered affirmatively.

Conventional science gives us a negative answer. It regards space and time as constituting a background, or setting, in which physical entities exist, and in which physical activity takes place. All existence, according to this view, is in space and in time. It then follows that there cannot be any existence outside of space and time. The prevailing scientific opinion is that this is an incontrovertible conclusion. Furthermore, it is claimed that every fact to which we have access can reasonably be explained in terms of the physical universe alone, as would be expected on the basis of the foregoing assertions.

Although it is generally conceded that this is the verdict of science at the present stage of knowledge, it is, to most scientists, an unwelcome conclusion. The great majority of these individuals have some kind of religious or philosophical convictions about non-physical existence that they are not willing to give up, regardless of how strong a case against the reality of such an existence science may present. For some this has created a very difficult situation. As expressed by du Nouy:

    It cannot be contested that the heart of many men is the stage of a conflict between the strictly intellectual activity of the brain, based on the progress of science, and the intuitive, religious, self. The greater the sincerity of the man, the more violent is the conflict.348

The fact that the clarification of the physical relationships in our study of the universe of motion has opened the door to an extension of this study into the non-physical realm thus has a profound significance. The physical findings clearly demolish what previously seemed to be an unassailable case against the reality of outside existence. Even the most casual consideration of the claim that every known fact has a reasonable explanation in physical terms is sufficient to show that the validity of this claim rests entirely on a subjective assessment of what constitutes a reasonable explanation in each individual case. The prevailing scientific position with respect to evidence of nonphysical existence thus amounts to nothing more than a refusal to recognize any evidence that is offered in favor of such existence. It follows that the scientific rejection of the possibility of existence outside the physical universe has no basis other than the premise that all existence is in space and in time.

In the universe of motion, this is not true. Space and time do not constitute a container for the entities and phenomena of that universe; they are contents of the universe. Once this is understood, the obstacle in the way of non-physical existence disappears. The results of the investigation here being reported show that the physical universe consists entirely of a specific finite quantity of a particular kind of motion. The question at issue now becomes: Can anything exist other than this quantity of this kind of motion?

This is an issue that can be investigated by standard scientific methods and procedures. We cannot apply the purely deductive method by which we have derived the answers to similar questions within the boundaries of the physical universe after establishing the validity of the fundamental postulates of the Reciprocal System of theory, as we have no assurance that the laws and principles of the physical universe are applicable to the outside region. We can, however, postulate the applicability of those of the previously established principles that are not subject to any obvious regional limitations, and test the validity of that postulate in the regular manner. In so doing, we are using one of the versatile tools of inductive reasoning: the extrapolation process. We are making the kind of an ”inference from experience“ upon which scientific theory was based before the ”inventive“ school of Einstein and his successors gained control of the scientific Establishment.

First, we assume the validity of the Principle of Uniformity, identified as Principle (b) in the list given at the beginning of this chapter. This principle then carries with it the validity of the other items in the list that are relevant to the point at issue, particularly the rationality of the outside existence, principle (a), and the assertion that what can exist does exist, principle (g). We know from observation that motion can exist. Our observations tell us only that it exists in a certain form and iri a certain finite quantity, but there is no indication of any kind of a limiting factor that would restrict it to this form and to this quantity. Principle (g) therefore tells us that motion can exist in other forms and in other quantities if our hypothesis as to the applicability of the Principle of Uniformity to the outside existence is valid.

Having formulated this hypothesis by extrapolating the principles and relations that we have established in the physical universe, we are then ready to verify it in the standard manner by developing the consequences of the hypothesis and comparing them with observation. Notwithstanding the scientific contention that all observed phenomena can be explained on a purely physical basis, it quickly becomes evident, when the verification process is undertaken, that many of the effects of non-physical existence required by the uniformity hypothesis are, in fact, observable. Their true status as unexplained non-physical phenomena has not heretofore been recognized because they coexist with many unexplained physical phenomena, and have not been distinguished from these obscure features of physical existence.

The findings of this extension of the investigation of the physical universe into the non-physical region are much too voluminous to be included with the physical results, and will be described in a separate publication, but it would not be appropriate to conclude the discussion in this volume without calling attention to the manner in which the clarification of the properties of the physical universe sets the stage for a confirmation of the reality of existence outside that universe. The more complete understanding of physical existence opens the door to an exploration of existence as a whole, including those nonphysical areas that have hitherto had to be left to religion and related branches of thought. It is now evident that our familiar material world is not the whole of existence, as modem science would have us believe. It is only a part—perhaps a very small part—of a greater whole.